Introduction



Many authors suggest that there is no single, well-developed theory of migration (Goss & Linquist 1995; Hirshman, Kasinitz & DeWind 1999; Portes 1999; Massey 1999; Arango 2004). The assumption of this article is that neither is there a single, well-developed theory on migrant smuggling of human beings, not only as regards volume and direction, but also as regards its structural-organisational nature. It seems, therefore, appropriate to attempt to clarify this matter without presuppositions by means of concrete analyses.

From the literature and from an analysis of Belgian case studies on human smuggling and trafficking from and through Eastern Europe, we observe that often ‘strongly structured flexible networks’ are at work in human smuggling. This indicates a different profile than, for example, presented by irregular transit migrations through Turkey (Içduygu and Toktas 2002). The effective structure is clear, in the Eastern European case, from two very demonstrable characteristics. In at least one third of the 50 case studies, verified with judicially registered cases which we could study (Belgium, 1995 to June 2003), mala fide travel agencies were used for organising human smuggling and were sometimes even set up on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, in 13 cases, there are clear indications of involvement from former intelligence circles. It is this second attribute we will discuss in this article.

Van Amersfoort has pointed to the importance of three aspects in the analysis of contemporary migrations (1998:15):

The first characteristic, transport links, constitutes at present no longer a hindrance. The second concerns the resources needed to make use of these connections, such as money or contacts (social capital)…. A third characteristic… are the rules for passports and visas (Van Liempt 2004: 6, translated from Dutch).

Criticising the network theories, Krissman rightly suggests that network theories in and of themselves often are insufficient to explain migratory movements because they are ‘both ahistorical and post factum’. All the actors and actions should be considered (2005: 5).

We argue in favour of further dividing ‘the resources needed to make use of these connections, such as money or contacts’ into more possibilities. Resources can apply only to the first or the third characteristic, but there can also be resources that constitute a second field efficiently connecting the two other aspects (transport links and rules for passports and visas) and that develop a specialisation on this level. Which intermediary structures can both provide good transport facilities and easily acquire the appropriate official documents? Travel agencies can take on this role. Another aspect that undoubtedly deserves more attention must be the organisation of a chain of safe houses and transit hotels. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated, the (former) ‘intelligence’ of some Eastern European countries can also occupy this intermediary field quite effectively.

It is repeatedly asserted in the literature that, during and after the implosion of communism, parts of the (former) security services were recycled by criminal organisations in some Eastern European countries with a view to greater efficiency. It is also true that several security employees had lost their jobs. Several sources mention the close alliances between former communist security services like the KGB and its satellites and organised crime (Gould 1997; Knight 1996; Handelman 1997; Varese 2001; McCauly 2001; Shelley 1997; Sterling 1995; Waller 1994). Because of this cooperation and the know-how and international contacts of the security services, the criminal organisations were able to professionalize (McCauley 2001; Shelley 1997).

In a number of files of organised human smuggling, we note that former ‘intelligence’ personnel, on the level of intermediary structures, were able to provide know-how and contacts to, for example, travel agencies. In a number of cases, they were even able to develop into entrepreneurs in the human smuggling and trafficking business. An important consequence of this is that it has the potential of involving official bodies.

In a broader literature study, we focus on Bulgaria and Albania because the empirical data from our research (in 13 of 50 cases) is situated mainly in that area. By way of conclusion, we will consider three cases more closely: one Albanian and two Bulgarian. They are cases about which we were able to obtain very detailed information through interviews with policemen, lawyers and embassy staff. Our research into these cases covers the period between 1999 and June 2003.

One final remark is appropriate to conclude this introduction. This article specifically focuses on the typically ‘large-scale’ smuggling networks that smuggle and traffic people from and/or via Eastern Europe. The smuggling practices from Eastern Europe that are ‘smaller in scale’ but no doubt also exist will not be discussed. This indicates a bias in our account. It is not the purpose to convince the reader that human smuggling is only a matter of large-scale networks. We observe only that, in a significant number of ‘Eastern European’ cases, the large-scale approach with the character of a business, albeit with very flexible networking, is indeed a fact. In, for example, a large Albanian case, 14.000 people were smuggled to England in just two years. This article will, in particular, demonstrate that in a fourth of the large-scale ‘flexible networks’, former staff from ‘intelligence’ very demonstrably played a central part.

We will first discuss the literature and subsequently enter into the case studies.